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Cloud computing may be defined as management and 
provision of resources, software, applications and 
information as services over the cloud (internet) on 
demand. Cloud computing is a model for enabling 
convenient, on demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort 
or service provider interaction [1]. With its ability to 
provide users dynamically scalable, shared resources over 
the Internet and avoid large upfront fixed costs, cloud 
computing has recently emerged as a promising hosting 
platform that performs an   intelligent usage of a collection 
of services, applications, information and infrastructure 
comprised of pools of computer, network, information and 
storage resources. However along with these advantages, 
storing a large amount of data including critical 
information on the cloud motivates highly skilled hackers 
thus creating a need for the security to be considered as 
one of the top issues while considering Cloud Computing. 
In this paper we explain the cloud computing along with its 
open secure architecture advantages in brief and 
emphasize on various security threats in cloud computing 
also the existing methods to control them along with their 




Cloud computing is the collection of virtualized and 
scalable resources, capable of hosting application and 
providing required services to the users with the “pay only 
for use” strategy where the users pay only for the number 
of service units they consume. A computing Cloud is a set 
of network enabled services, providing scalable, QoS 
guaranteed, normally personalized, inexpensive computing 
infrastructures on demand, which could be accessed in a 
simple and pervasive way. [2] 
 
1.1. Characteristics of cloud computing 
 
Cloud computing exhibit five essential characteristics 
defined by NIST (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology) [1].         
1. On-demand self-service. A consumer can unilaterally 
provision computing capabilities.  
2. Broad network access. Capabilities are available over 
the network and accessed through standard mechanisms 
that promote use by heterogeneous thin or thick client 
platforms.                      
3. Resource pooling. The provider’s computing resources 
are pooled to serve multiple consumers, with different 
physical and virtual resources dynamically assigned and 
reassigned according to consumer demand.  
4. Rapid elasticity. Capabilities can be rapidly and 
elastically provisioned, in some cases automatically, to 
quickly scale out and rapidly released to quickly scale in.  
 5. Measured service. Cloud systems automatically control 
and optimize resource use by leveraging a metering 
capability at some level of abstraction appropriate to the 
type of service.  
 
2. Open Security Architecture of cloud 
computing  
 
Cloud computing can be defined as the provision of 
computing services via the Internet such as [7] Applications 
(software-as-a-service, or SaaS), Platforms, Infrastructure 
(IaaS), Process orchestration and integration 
Figure 1 shows the open secure architecture of cloud 
computing [4]. The Open Security Architecture cloud 
computing pattern is an attempt to illustrate core cloud 
functions, the key roles for oversight and risk mitigation, 
collaboration across various internal organizations, and the 
controls that require additional emphasis. 
The various controls in this architecture are [7] 
• SA-1/4/5 System and Services Acquisition: ensure that 
acquisition of services is managed correctly. 
• CP-1 (contingency planning): ensure a clear 
understanding of how to respond in the event of 
interruptions to service delivery. 
• Risk Assessments controls: helps to understand the 
risks associated with services in a business context. 
The pattern also provides a view into activities that are 
shared by security architects, security managers, and 
business managers. They should: 
• Agree on the control baseline applicable to this cloud 
sourcing activity/service. 
• Confirm how this translates into the control framework 
of the cloud provider. 
• Decide on additional risk mitigating controls. 
 
 
Figure 1. Cloud Computing Model - Open Secure 
Architecture [OSA09]. 
 
There are a number of key control areas that should be 
considered carefully before moving the computing 
operations to cloud services: Contractual agreements, 
Certification and third-party audits, Compliance 
requirements, Availability, reliability, and resilience, 
Backup and recovery, Service levels and performance, 
Decommissioning. If the process is comprised of a number 
of cloud services, then supporting services such as security, 
load monitoring & testing and provisioning and 
configuration management are required.  
 
3. Feasibility of Cloud Computing 
 
3. 1. Advantages of Cloud Computing [4]:  
The following are some of the major advantages of 
cloud computing: 
• Virtualization. Virtualization is defined as decoupling 
and separation of the business service from the 
infrastructure needed to run it.  
• Flexibility to choose vendor.  
• Elasticity. Elastic nature of the infrastructure allows to  
rapidly allocate and de-allocate massively scalable 
resources to business services on a demand basis.  
• Cost Reduction. Reduced costs due to operational 
efficiencies, and more rapid deployment of new 
business services.  
 
3.2. Obstacles and opportunities of cloud 
computing 
 
The following table shows the top ten obstacles and 
opportunities of cloud computing. 
 
Table1. Obstacles and opportunities of cloud 
computing [3]. 
No Obstacle Opportunities 
1 Availability/Business 
Continuity 
Use Multiple Cloud 
Providers 
2 Data Lock-In Standardize APIs; 
Compatible SW to enable 
Surge or Hybrid Cloud 
Computing 




4 Data Transfer 
Bottlenecks 




Improved VM Support; 
Flash Memory; Gang 
Schedule VMs 
6 Scalable Storage Invent Scalable Store 
7 Bugs in Large 
Distributed Systems 
Invent Debugger that relies 
on Distributed VMs 
8 Scaling Quickly Invent Auto-Scalar that 
relies on ML; Snapshots 
for Conservation 
9 Reputation Fate 
Sharing 
Offer reputation-guarding 
services like those for 
email 
10 Software Licensing Pay-for-use licenses 
 
Despite of these obstacles as well as opportunities and 
advantages, cloud computing raises several security issues 
and hence security is still the primary concern of many 
customers who want to leverage public cloud services. 
 
4. Cloud Computing Security Threats 
 
4.1. Top Seven Security Threats 
 
Top seven security threats to cloud computing 
discovered by “Cloud Security Alliance” (CSA) are [6]: 
 
1. Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Computing. Abuse 
and nefarious use of cloud computing is the top threat 
identified by the CSA. A simple example of this is the use 
of botnets to spread spam and malware. Attackers can 
infiltrate a public cloud, for example, and find a way to 
upload malware to thousands of computers and use the 
power of the cloud infrastructure to attack other machines. 
      Suggested remedies by the CSA to lessen this threat:  
• Stricter initial registration and validation processes. 
• Enhanced credit card fraud monitoring and 
coordination. 
• Comprehensive introspection of customer network 
traffic. 
• Monitoring public blacklists for one’s own network 
blocks. 
 
2. Insecure Application Programming Interfaces. As 
software interfaces or APIs are what customers use to 
interact with cloud services, those must have extremely 
secure authentication, access control, encryption and 
activity monitoring mechanisms - especially when third 
parties start to build on them.  
Suggested remedies by CSA to lessen this threat: 
• Analyze the security model of cloud provider 
interfaces. 
• Ensure strong authentication and access controls are 
implemented in concert with encrypted transmission. 
• Understand the dependency chain associated with the 
API. 
 
3. Malicious Insiders. The malicious insider threat is one 
that gains in importance as many providers still don't reveal 
how they hire people, how they grant them access to assets 
or how they monitor them. Transparency is, in this case, 
vital to a secure cloud offering, along with compliance 
reporting and breach notification. 
Suggested remedies by CSA to lessen this threat: 
• Enforce strict supply chain management and conduct a 
comprehensive supplier assessment. 
• Specify human resource requirements as part of legal 
contracts. 
• Require transparency into overall information security 
and management practices, as well as compliance 
reporting. 
• Determine security breach notification processes. 
 
4. Shared Technology Vulnerabilities. Sharing 
infrastructure is a way of life for IaaS providers. 
Unfortunately, the components on which this infrastructure 
is based were not designed for that. To ensure that 
customers don't thread on each other's "territory", 
monitoring and strong compartmentalization is required. 
Suggested remedies by CSA to lessen this threat: 
• Implement security best practices for 
installation/configuration. 
• Monitor environment for unauthorized 
changes/activity. 
• Promote strong authentication and access control for 
administrative access and operations. 
• Enforce service level agreements for patching and 
vulnerability remediation. 
• Conduct vulnerability scanning and configuration 
audits. 
 
5. Data Loss/Leakage. Be it by deletion without a backup, 
by loss of the encoding key or by unauthorized access, data 
is always in danger of being lost or stolen. This is one of 
the top concerns for businesses, because they not only stand 
to lose their reputation, but are also obligated by law to 
keep it safe 
Suggested remedies by CSA to lessen this threat: 
• Implement strong API access control. 
• Encrypt and protect integrity of data in transit. 
• Analyze data protection at both design and run time. 
• Implement strong key generation, storage and 
management, and destruction practices. 
• Contractually demand providers to wipe persistent 
media before it is released into the pool. 
• Contractually specify provider backup and retention 
strategies. 
 
6. Account, Service & Traffic Hijacking. Account service 
and traffic hijacking is another issue that cloud users need 
to be aware of. These threats range from man-in-the-middle 
attacks, to phishing and spam campaigns, to denial-of-
service attacks. 
Suggested remedies by CSA to lessen this threat: 
• Prohibit the sharing of account credentials between 
users and services. 
• Leverage strong two-factor authentication techniques 
where possible. 
• Employ proactive monitoring to detect unauthorized 
activity. 
• Understand cloud provider security policies and SLAs. 
 
7. Unknown Risk Profile. Security should always in the 
upper portion of the priority list. Code updates, security 
practices, vulnerability profiles, intrusion attempts - all 
things that should always be kept in mind.  
Suggested remedies by CSA to lessen this threat: 
• Disclosure of applicable logs and data. 
• Partial/full disclosure of infrastructure details (e.g., 
patch levels, firewalls, etc.). 
• Monitoring and alerting on necessary information. 
 
4.2. Other Security Threats [14, 18] 
 
1. Failures in Providers Security. Cloud providers 
control the hardware and the hypervisors on which 
data is stored and applications are run and hence their 
security is very important while designing cloud. 
2.  Attacks by other customer. If the barriers between 
customers break down, one customer can access 
another customer's data or interfere with their 
applications. 
3. Availability and reliability issues. The cloud is only 
usable through the Internet so Internet reliability and 
availability is essential. 
4. Legal and Regulatory issues. The virtual, 
international nature of cloud computing raises many 
legal and regulatory issues regarding the data exported 
outside the jurisdiction. 
5. Perimeter security model broken. Many 
organizations use a perimeter security model with 
strong security at the perimeter of the enterprise 
network. The cloud is certainly outside the perimeter 
of enterprise control but it will now store critical data 
and applications. 
6. Integrating Provider and Customer Security 
Systems. Cloud providers must integrate with existing 
systems or the bad old days of manual provisioning 
and uncoordinated response will return. 
 
5. Security in Cloud Computing [7] 
 
• Infrastructure Security. The security challenges at 
various levels namely network level, host level and 
application level are not specifically caused by cloud 
computing instead are exacerbated by its use. The 
issues of infrastructure security and cloud computing 
can be addressed by clearly defining trust boundaries 
by understanding which party provides which part of 
security [7]. 
 
• Data Security and Storage. Data security is a 
significant task, with a lot of complexity. Methods of 
data protection, such as redaction, truncations, 
obfuscation, and others, should be viewed with great 
concern. Not only are there no accepted standards for 
these alternative methods, but also there are no 
programs to validate the implementations of whatever 
could possibly be developed. Homomorphic 
encryption can be used for data security encryption. 
But with this approach key management is a problem 
[7]. 
 
• Identity and Access Management (IAM). The key 
critical success factor to managing identities at cloud 
providers is to have a robust federated identity 
management architecture and strategy internal to the 
organization. Using cloud-based “Identity as a 
Service” providers may be a useful tool for 
outsourcing some identity management capabilities 
and facilitating federated identity management with 
cloud providers [8].  
 
• Security Management. From a security management 
perspective, a key issue is the lack of enterprise-grade 
access management features. The scope of security 
management of cloud services will vary with the 
service delivery model, provider capabilities, and 
maturity. Customers will have to make trade-offs with 
respect to the flexibility and control offered by the SPI 
services. The more flexible the service, the more 
control you can exercise on the service, and with that 
come additional security management responsibilities. 
In a virtualized environment where infrastructure is 
shared across multiple tenants, your data is 
commingled with that of other customers at every 
phase of the life cycle—during transit, processing, and 
storage. Hence, it is important to understand the 
location of the service, service-level guarantees such as 
inter-node communication, and storage access (read 
and write) latency [7]. 
 
• Privacy. Privacy is an important issue for cloud 
computing, both in terms of legal compliance and user 
trust and this need to be considered at every phase of 
design. The key challenge for software engineers to 
design cloud services in such a way as to decrease 
privacy risk and to ensure legal compliance. The 
following tips are recommended for cloud system 
designers, architects, developers and Testers [9]. 
1. Minimize personal information sent to and stored 
in the cloud. 
2. Protect personal information in the cloud. 
3. Maximize user control. 
4. Allow user choice. 
5. Specify and limit the purpose of data usage. 
6. Provide feedback.   
(Please refer [21] for more details on privacy). 
 
• Audit and Compliance. A programmatic approach to 
monitoring and compliance will help prepare CSPs 
(Cloud Service Provider) and their users to address 
emerging requirements and the evolution of cloud 
business models. To drive efficiency, risk 
management, and compliance, CSPs need to 
implement a strong internal control monitoring 
function coupled with a robust external audit process. 
To gain comfort over their in-cloud activities, CSP 
users need to define their control requirements, 
understand their CSP’s internal control monitoring 
processes, analyze relevant external audit reports, and 
properly execute their responsibilities as CSP users [7]. 
 • Security-as-a [cloud] Service. Security-as-a-service is 
likely to see significant future growth for two reasons. 
First, a continuing shift in information security work 
from in-house to outsourced will continue. Second, 
several other information security needs are present for 
organizations currently, but they will accelerate in 
need and complexity with the growing adoption of 
cloud computing. The two proactive controls are 
important to the growth of cloud computing: identity 
management that is inter-cloud and scalable to the 
cloud size, and (encryption) key management. The two 
reactive controls are needed for audit and compliance 
purposes as well: scalable and effective SIEM, and 
data leakage prevention (DLP). Providing solutions to 
each of these controls will be difficult and requires 
significant complexity that must be hugely scalable 
and yet easy to use [7]. 
 
6. EXISTING SOLUTIONS FOR SECURITY 
THREATS 
 
6.1. Mirage Image Management System [10] 
 
 The security and integrity of VM images are the 
foundation for the overall security of the cloud since many 
of them are designed to be shared by different and often 
unrelated users. This system addresses the issues related to 
secure management of the virtual-machine images that 
encapsulate each application of the cloud.  
Figure 2 shows the overall architecture of Mirage 
Image Management System.  
Mirage Image Management System consists of 4 major 
components: 
1. Access Control. This framework regulates the sharing 
of VM images. Each image in the repository has a 
unique owner, who can share images with trusted 
parties by granting access permissions. 
2. Image Transformation by Running Filters. Filters 
remove unwanted information from images at 
publishes and retrieval time. Filters at publish time can 
remove or hide sensitive information from the 
publisher's original image. Filters at retrieval time 
filters may be specified by the publisher or the 
retriever. 
3. Provenance Tracking. This mechanism that tracks the 
derivation history of an image. 
4. Image maintenance. Repository maintenance 
services, such as periodic virus scanning, that detect 
and fix vulnerabilities discovered after images are 
published. 
 
Advantages. Filters mitigate the risk in a systematic and 
efficient way. The system stores all the revisions which 
allows the user to go back to the previous version if the 
current version if she desires. The default access 
permission for an image is private so that only owner and 
system administrator can access the image and hence 
untrusted parties cannot access the image.  
 
 
Figure 2. Architecture of Mirage Image 
Management System. 
 
Limitations. Huge performance overheads, both in space 
and time. Filters cannot be 100% accurate and hence the 
system does not eliminate risk entirely. Virus scanning 
does not guarantee to find all malware in an image. "The 
ability to monitor or control customer content" might 
increase the liability of the repository provider 
(For detailed explanation about Mirage Image Management 
System please refer [21]). 
 
6.2. Client Based Privacy Manager [11] 
 
Client based privacy manager helps to reduce the risk 
of data leakage and loss of privacy of the sensitive data 
processed in the cloud, and provides additional privacy-
related benefits. 
Figure 3 shows the overall architecture of the privacy 
manager. The main features of the privacy manager are: 
• Obfuscation. This feature can automatically obfuscate 
some or all of the fields in a data structure before it is 
sent off to the cloud for processing, and translate the 
output from the cloud back into de-obfuscated form. 
The obfuscation and de-obfuscation is done using a 
key which is chosen by the user and not revealed to 
cloud service providers.  
• Preference Setting. This is a method for allowing 
users to set their preferences about the handling of 
personal data that is stored in an unobfuscated form 
within the cloud. This feature allows the user greater 
control over the usage of his data. 
• Data Access. The Privacy Manager contains a module 
that allows users to access personal information in the 
cloud, in order to see what is being held about them, 
and to check its accuracy. This is an auditing 
mechanism which will detect privacy violations once 
they have happened. 
• Feedback. The Feedback module manages and 
displays feedback to the user regarding usage of his 
personal information, including notification of data 
usage in the cloud. This module could monitor 
personal data that is transferred from the platform. 
• Personae. This feature allows the user to choose 
between multiple personae when interacting with cloud 
services. (Please refer [21] for detailed description of 
Privacy Manager). 
 
Figure 3. Overview of Privacy Manager. 
 
Advantages. This solution solves many practical problems 
such as Sales Force Automation Problem, Customized End-
User Services Problem and Share Portfolio Calculation 
problem. (Please refer [21] for detailed explanation of these 
solutions) 
 
Disadvantages. If the service provider does not provide 
full cooperation the features of the Privacy Manager other 
than obfuscation will not be effective, since they require the 
honest cooperation of the service provider. The ability to 
use obfuscation without any cooperation from the service 
provider depends not only on the user having sufficient 
computing resources to carry out the obfuscation and 
deobfuscation, but also on the application having been 
implemented in such a way that it will work with 
obfuscation. 
 
6.3. Transparent Cloud Protection System (TCPS) 
[12] 
 
TCPS is a protection system for clouds aimed at 
transparently monitoring the integrity of cloud components. 
TCPS is intended to protect the integrity of guest Virtual 
Machines (VM) and of the distributed computing 
middleware by allowing the host to monitor guest VMs and 
infrastructure components. 
Figure 4 shows the architecture of TCPS. TCPS is a 
middleware whose core is located between the Kernel and 
the virtualization layer. (Please refer [21] for detailed 
explanation of TCPS architecture). By either actively or 
passively monitoring key kernel or cloud components 
TCPS can detect any possible modification to kernel data 
and code, thus guaranteeing that kernel and cloud 
middleware integrity has not been compromised and 
consequently no attacker has made its way into the system.  
 
Figure 4. TCPS Architecture. 
 
All TCPS modules reside on the Host and Qemu is 
leveraged to access the guest. Suspicious guest activity can 
be noticed by the Interceptor and they are recorded by the 
Warning Recorder into the Warning Queue where the 
potential alteration will be evaluated by the Detector 
component. TCPS can locally react to security breaches or 
notify the distributed computing security components of 
such an occurrence. In order to avoid false positives as 
much as possible, an administrator can notify TCPS of the 
new components' checksum. 
 
Advantages. This system is effective in detecting most 
kind of attacks. This system is able to avoid false-positives 
(Guest maintenance tolerance). The system minimizes the 
visibility from the VMs (Transparency). The system and 
the sibling guests are protected from attacks of a 
compromised guest. The system can be deployed on 
majority of the available middleware.The system can detect 
an intrusion attempt over a guest and, if required by the 
security policy, takes appropriate actions against the 
attempt or against the compromised guest and/or notify 
remote middleware security-management components. 
 
6.4. Secure and Efficient Access to Outsourced 
Data [13] 
Providing secure and efficient access to outsourced 
data is an important component of cloud computing and 
forms the foundation for information management and 
other operations.  
Problem. Figure 5 shows the typical owner-write-user-
read scenario. Only the owner can make updates to the 
outsourced data, while the users can read the information 
according to access rights. Since the data owner stores a 
large amount of information on the untrusted service 
provider, the owner has to encrypt the outsourced data 
before putting on the server. The outsourced data will be 
accessed by different end users all over the network and 
hence computationally expensive operations on the data 
blocks (smallest unit of data) should be avoided and the 
amount of data stored in the end users must be reduced. 
Right keys should be provided to the end users to control 
their access.  
 
Figure 5. Illustration of application scenario 
 
Solution. Fine-grained access control should be 
provided for the outsourced data by encrypting every data 
block with a different symmetric key. (Please refer [21] for 
key derivation method). 
Data Access Procedure. 
1. End user U will send a data access request to the data 
owner O. 
 U -> O: {U, O, EKou , (U, O, request index, data block 
indexes, MAC code)} 
2. Data owner O authenticates the sender, verify the 
request and determine the smallest key set  
 O-> U: { U, O, EKou, (O, U, request index, ACM index, 
seed for P(), K|, cert for S, MAC code)} 
 The cert in the packet is a certificate for the service 
provider and it has the following format: 
 {EKos, (U, request index, ACM index, seed, indexes of 
data blocks, MAC code)} 
3. End user U sends {U, S, request index, cert} to the 
service provider S. 
4. Service Provider S verifies the cert, check the user and 
ACM index, and retrieve data blocks, and conduct over 
encryption as follows. Using seed as the initial state of 
P(), the function will generate a long sequence of 
pseudo random bits. S will use this bit sequence as 
one-time pad and conduct the xor operation to the 
encrypted blocks. The computation results will then be 
sent to U. 
5. End user U receives the data blocks, use seed and K| to 
derive keys, and then recover the data.  
 
Dynamics in Use Access Rights. 
• Grant Access Right. The owner will change the 
access control matrix and increase the value of ACM 
index. The service provider and end user do not need 
to change to adapt to this update. 
• Revoke Access Right: If the service provider conducts 
over encryption, the owner updates the access control 
matrix, increases the value of ACM index and sends 
this new ACM index to the service provider until it 
receives acknowledgement. If the services provider 
refuses to conduct over encryption, then adopt lazy 
revocation to prevent revoked users from getting 
access to updated data blocks.  
 
Dynamics in Outsourced Data. 
• Block Deletion. A special control block is used to 
replace the deleted block. The owner will label its 
access control matrix to show that the block no longer 
exists 
• Block Update. The control block is encrypted with kp,i 
and write it to the i-th block of the outsourced data. 
The control block will contain the following 
information: (1) a pointer to the data block in which D|i 
is currently stored; (2) information used by the data 
owner to derive the encryption key of D|i ; (3) 
information used by the data owner to verify the 
integrity of the control block. The owner will also use 
the new secret to encrypt D0i and write it to the 
corresponding place in S. 
• Block Insertion and Appending. The data owner will 
locate an unused block index, derive the encryption 
key in the hierarchy using k0,1, encrypt the data block, 
and store it on the service provider. The new data 
blocks are inserted based on their access patterns. 
 
Advantages. Data access procedure reduces the overhead 
of the data owner and prevents the revoked users from 
getting access to the outsourced data. This approach is 
robust against collusive attacks if the hash function is safe. 
Over-encryption conducted by the service provider defends 
against eavesdroppers even when they have the data block 
encryption keys. This approach has less communication 
and overhead for data retrieval when they have infrequent 
update operations. This approach handles user revocation 
without impacting service provider. 
 
Disadvantages. This approach is applicable only for 
owner-write-users-read applications and hence not generic. 
There is a lengthened data retrieval delay caused by the 
access to updated data blocks. (For detailed explanation of 
this approach please refer Survey on Cloud Computing 




More than ten papers were surveyed regarding the 
cloud computing, advantages of cloud computing, risks in 
cloud computing and various approaches to solve those 
risks each with their pros and cons. Each algorithm is 
aimed at solving a particular risk. However cloud 
computing is still struggling in its infancy, with positive 
and negative comments made on its possible 
implementation for a large-sized enterprise. IT technicians 
are spearheading the challenge and pursuing research to 
improve on its drawbacks. Several groups have recently 
been formed, such as the Cloud Security Alliance or the 
Open Cloud Consortium, with the goal of exploring the 
possibilities offered by cloud computing and to establish a 
common language among different providers. Cloud 
computing is facing several issues in gaining recognition 
for its merits. Its security deficiencies and benefits need to 
be carefully weighed before making a decision to 
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